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COMMENT
EMPLOYER PRE-ELECTION COERCION: A SUGGESTED
APPROACH FOR EFFECTIVE REMEDIAL ACTION
Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act 1 gives the
National Labor Relations Board broad and flexible powers to cure
the effects of unfair labor practices.' Congress clearly intended that
greater judicial deference be given to the Board's choice of remedy
than to its findings of legislatively defined unfair labor practices.' The
remedial power of the Board is limited only in that its orders must
effectuate the policies of the act.4 Courts have interpreted this limitation to require that the orders perform a restorative, rather than a del49 Stat. 454 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964) [hereinafter cited
as the NLRA] provides:
If . . . the Board shall be of the opinion that any person named in the
complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then
the Board shall . . . issue and cause to be served on such person an order
requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and
to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees, with
or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this subchapter.
2 H.R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 23, 24 (1935) :
The Board is empowered according to the procedure provided in section
10, to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice ....
The Board is thus made the paramount agency for dealing with the unfair
labor practices described in the bill.
The orders will of course be adapted to the needs of the individual case.
See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941): "[Tlhe relation
"
of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence ....
3 See Note, The Need for Creative Orders Under Section 10(c) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 69, 73 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Section
10(c) Orders]. When Congress amended the NLRA in 1947, § 10(c) suffered only
minor alterations. It was changed to require a "preponderance of the testimony" for
issuance of an order, rather than issuing "upon all the testimony taken." LaborManagement Relations Act, § 10(c), 61 Stat. 147 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(c) (1964) [hereinafter cited as LMRA]. Given the fact that the LMRA
was a major revision of the NLRA, and that it concentrated primarily on substantive
changes in the scheme of unfair labor practices, it is fair to assume that Congress
was satisfied with the then existing remedial structure. Congress did limit the
Board's remedial power in one aspect: "no order of the Board shall require the
reinstatement of any individual . . . suspended or discharged for cause." LMRA
§ 10(c),
61 Stat 147 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
4
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964); NLRB v.
Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 348 (1953) :
It is not for us to weigh these or countervailing considerations. Nor
should we require the Board to make a quantitative appraisal of the relevant
factors, assuming the unlikely, that an appraisal is feasible. As is true of
many comparable judgments by those who are steeped in the actual workings
of these specialized matters, the Board's conclusions may "express an intuition
of experience which outruns analysis and sums up many unnamed and tangled
impressions . . ." ; and they are none the worse for it. . ..
* * . It seems more profitable to stick closely to the direction of the Act
by considering what order does, . . . and what order does not, bear appropriate relation to the policies of the Act.
Cf. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540 (1943). But see,
Hearings Before the Committee on Education and Labor on S. 1958, 74th Cong.,
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terrent or penal function.5 However, despite this broad congressional
mandate, the Board's remedial responses to unfair labor practices
dealing with employer pre-election coercion' have often been
inadequate.'
THE ELECTION AND ITS AFTERMATH

Traditionally the Board has exercised great control over activities during an NLRB election campaign.'

It insisted in General

Corp.9

that an election be conducted in a laboratory atmosphere
Shoe
and that "conduct that creates an atmosphere which renders improbable
a free choice will sometimes warrant invalidating an election, even
though that conduct may not constitute an unfair labor practice." 10
The Board thus will employ its general power to conduct elections to
invalidate an election tainted by unfair election practices." This power
should not be confused with the Board's section 10(c) remedial powers.
The important distinction, since no unfair labor practice has been committed, is that the Board is powerless to issue either a cease and
1st Sess. 448-49 (1935) (remarks of Robert T. Caldwell, Attorney for The American
Rolling Mill Company):
I think . . . that the relief that you may administer is indefinite.
[Y]ou can tell . . . [the employer] to desist from an unfair labor practice.
That is specific . . . but it says in addition . . . you may tell him to take
such affirmative action as the Board may think proper. Well, now, that takes
I think that is
in the universe, the Board can tell him to do anything ....
entirely too indefinite and very dangerous.
5 See, e.g., Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 655
(1961). See also Town & Country Mfg. Co., Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1029 (1962),
enforced, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963) :
It is axiomatic that remedial action, if it is to afford an effective redress for
the commission of a statutory wrong, must be tailored to restore the wronged
to the position he woudd have occupied lint for the action of the wrongdoer.
(Emphasis added.)
0Employer pre-election coercion can best be defined as any employer unfair labor
practice justifying some remedial response by the NLRB to insure employee free
choice. These practices may be contrasted to the isolated unfair labor practice where
effects on employee electoral freedom are considered de minimis. See Yankee Lobster
Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1590 (1965); West Texas Equip. Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1963);
Middletown Mfg. Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 234 (1963) (dictum).
ON NLRB, HousE CoMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 87TH
7 See SuBcommrr
CONG., 1ST Ssss., ADMINISTRATION OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT BY
THE NLRB 2 (Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter cited as PucINsKI REPORT]; McCulloch, An Evaluation of the Remedies Available to the NLRB, 15 LAB. L.J. 755 (1964) ;
Address by Chairman McCulloch, Federal Bar Association Convention, in 30 U.S.L.
W=EE 2133 (Sept. 19, 1961).
8 See Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966); Peerless Plywood
Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953).
9 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
'l Id. at 126. Furthermore, the NLRB in setting aside an election does not consider itself bound by the guarantees of employer free speech found in § 8(c). 61 Stat
See Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B.
142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1964).
1782, 1787 (1962); Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation
Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REv. 38, 103 (1964).
See
11NLRA §9(c), 49 Stat 453, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1964).
Des Moines Glove Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 225 (1964); Claussen Baking Co., 134 N.L.R.B.
111 (1961); Myrna Mills, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 767 (1961); Bonita Ribbon Mills and
Brewton Weaving Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 1115 (1949).
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desist order or to take affirmative action, but only can order a new
election.' 2 The Board, however, has taken steps to insure that the
employee electorate is fully informed of its finding of employer
interference.' 3
Often employer election tactics go beyond disruption of laboratory
conditions and become substantive violations of the act.' 4 When the
employer commits an unfair labor practice during the critical period
of organizational activity, the ingenuity of the NLRB is tested. The
union may react to the commission of an unfair labor practice by the
employer in a number of ways, and it is this reaction which will
determine the stage at which the Board will enter the case.'" If an
election date has been set before the unfair labor practice is committed,
the union may either file an unfair labor practice charge, in which
case the election is postponed until resolution of the charge,' or proceed with the election and, if unsuccessful, press its complaint.'
If the union chooses to file an unfair labor practice charge when
the act is committed, the employer may consent to a settlement, in
which case much of the coercive effect of the unfair labor practice may
' 2 Since the new election is ordered on grounds other than commission of an
unfair labor practice, the Board takes action only on the basis of its power to conduct
elections. Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429 (1953) : "We institute this
rule pursuant to our statutory authority and obligation to conduct elections in circumstances and under conditions which will insure employees a free and untrammeled
choice." The Board's § 9(c) powers are less important in setting aside elections
since Dal-Tex Optical, 137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962), which adopted a "total context'
approach in dealing with employer election statements. See FoRuosca, A TRFATiSE
ON LABOR LAw, 612 (2d ed. 1965), for an explanation of the "total context' approach.
's Lufkin Rule Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 341 (1964); Morgan Dyeing & Bleaching,
Inc., 2 LAB. REL. REP. (56 L.R.R.M.) 1223 (May 21, 1964); 29 NLRB ANN. REP.
62 (1964). In Lufkin Rule, mipra, the Board ordered the employer to post a notice
stating that a new election would be held because the employer had impeded the employees' right to free choice. The order was issued despite the employer's objection
that this notice would be prejudicial (suggesting to the employees that the NLRB,
in view of the employer's misconduct, favored a vote for the union). The employer
also argued that he could adequately apprise his employees of the upcoming re-run
election.
14 Implied threats or benefits are a good example of employer practices which
have recently been held violative of § 8(a) (1). 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1964). TRW Semiconductors, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. No. 43
(1966), 2 LAB. RE.. REP'. (62 L.R.R.M.) 1469 (June 15, 1966) ; E-Town Sportswear
Corp., 141 N.L.R.B. 480 (1963) ; Marsh Supermarkets, Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 899 (1963).
-5This was not always the case. Before Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B.
1782 (1962), election cases and unfair labor practice cases were governed by different
standards. The representation election would be set aside if substantial interference
existed; but, when the conduct alleged to have interfered with the election could be
held to be such interference only upon an initial finding that an unfair labor practice
was committed, it was the Board's policy not to inquire into such matters in the
guise of considering objections to an election. This produced a forced choice either
to litigate that issue before the Board and forego an election or proceed with the
election and forego the unfair labor practice charge in the case of violations of § 8
(a) (5). 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(5) (1964). See
Aiello Dairy Farms, 110 N.L.R.B. 1365 (1954). Berne Foam Prods. Co., 146
N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964), dispenses with the necessity that a choice be made, since filing
an election petition no longer is deemed a waiver of the unfair labor practice charges.
'o See FoRKoscH, op. cit. supra note 12, at 617.
17 See, e.g., Irving Air Chute Co. v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1965) ; Colson
Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1965).

EMPLOYER PRE-ELECTION COERCION

be removed and the representation election may proceed.18 On the
other hand, the employer and union may litigate their dispute and
await the findings of the Board (usually a period exceeding nine
months)." Assuming a violation was committed, after such a lapse
of time it is virtually impossible for the Board to return the parties
to the status quo ante-the point in the organizational campaign just
prior to the employer's violation.2" Thus, in many cases the Board's
standard remedy to cease and desist from the unfair labor practices
and to post notices of compliance is likely to be ineffective, since the
union has either relinquished any attempt to organize the unit or must
begin anew to build the organizational machinery essential for
victory.2
In other cases, the union, having committed its resources to the
organizational campaign, perserveres even in the face of the most
If the campaign proves unblatant employer unfair labor practices.'
successful, charges may be filed; again the union will be forced to wait
until the case is decided by the NLRB. Discouraged by delay, those
employees originally favoring the union may well have either lost
interest or become convinced that the law inadequately protects their
organizational rights.23 Any standard order to cease and desist from
"Such agreements were made in 75 per cent
38 Voluntary settlement is frequent.
of the 3,514 meritorious charges filed during the first 10 months of . . . [fiscal year
1964]." McCulloch, stpra note 7, at 757. But see Pollitt, NLRB Re-Rum Elections:
A Study, 41 N.C.L. REv. 209, 221 (1963), who believes that re-run elections following
employer settlements are decided against the union in eighty per cent of the cases since
they 9are normally conducted too soon after the employer violations.
1 In fiscal 1965 the median elapsed time from filing of the charges until issuance
of the complaint was 59 days. 30 NLRB ANN. RE'. 11 (1965). The case must next
be heard by a trial examiner and his decision may be appealed to the Board. In
fiscal 1964 there was a median span of 337 days from the filing of the charge to the
decision by the Labor Board. HEARING BFxoRE THE SuBcomxamrr= ON THE NLRB
OF THE HousE Codmmtrrm oN EDUCATION AND LABOR, 89rH CONG., 2D SEss., REVMw
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT 68 (Comm. Print 1966) (statement by

Chairman McCulloch) [hereinafter cited as 1966 HEARINGS OF THE NLRA]. PuCINSKI REPORT 20, suggested that the Board adopt a policy of limited review of examiners'
orders.
20 This delay in Board processes encourages dilatory tactics in representation
elections. When these tactics succeed the Board is further hampered in attempting
to restore the status quo ante. PucINsKI REPORT 15-20.
21 Glazer Steel Corp., 2 LAB. RErL REP. (64 L.R.M.) 1239 (1967); Bridgeport
Brass Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 1332 (1961); Kendall Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 502 (1960), cited
in Section 10(c) Orders 82, where the author advances an argument for § 10(j),
61 Stat 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1964), injunctive relief in such cases. For
further discussion of § 10(j), see notes 121-35 inf ra and accompanying text.
22See note 17 supra. This is often true in cases under § 8(a) (5). 49 Stat. 452
(1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964). E.g., Irving Air Chute Co., 149
N.L.R.B. 627 (1964), enforced, 350 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1965).
2 HEARINGS BEFoRE THE Suncommrrran ON THE NLRB OF THE HOUSE Coanurrra
ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 89TH CONG., IST SESS., INVESTIGATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, AS AMiENDED, BY THE NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS BoARD 24849 (Comm. Print 1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965
HEARINGS ON THE NLRA]. See note 21 supra. It is unreasonable to expect the
worker to chance an employer's discharging him when he observes the resisting
employer succeed in thwarting previous attempts to organize. See PUCiNsEI REPORT
17 for an extreme example of continued employer disregard for the law in Spartanburg Sportswear Inc., 116 N.L.R.B. 1914 (1956), enforced, 246 F.2d 366 (4th Cir.
1957) (per curiam).
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the unfair labor practices and to post notices that the employer will
not engage in the specific practices condemned will usually be an
exercise in futility.24 It is in this posture that the remedies issued by
the Board must be examined and their effectiveness weighed. Given
the importance of the time factor, the NLRB has several remedies at
its disposal.2 5
THE RE-RUN ELECTION AND RELATED RESTORATIVE TECHNIQUES

In about seventeen per cent of contested elections the complaints
are held to be meritorious (about one per cent of the total number of
representation elections held)*6 Re-run elections produce a change
27
of result in approximately one-third of these cases, a change which
cannot be considered de minimis. The re-run election, when combined
with the cease and desist order and appropriate notice, is generally
2
considered the standard remedy for employer pre-election coercion.
29
cease
Despite problems generated by the lapse of time, a standard
and desist order coupled with an order for a new election may be an
adequate restorative technique, 0 since there are several employer
3
violations which can be cured by use of the re-run. ' In such cases,
the employer violation may not have destroyed the organizational
potential in the specific unit. The union may still have its partisans
and, in some cases, the union, by filing a charge, has postponed the
24
SectionL 10(c) Orders 82, recognizes this problem and suggests possible action,
such as captive audience speeches by union representatives or increased solicitation,
which the Board might order to counteract the impediments to renewed organizational activity.
25 See notes 21, 24 supra. The fact situation in Kendall Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 502
(1960), argues persuasively for employee concerted activities. Since § 7 protects the
right of the employees to strike and engage in other concerted activities, when the
employer commits unfair labor practices, employees can cure some of the time lag
difficulties inherent in NLRB determinations. The Board will reinstate all unfair
labor practice strikers if a violation is found so that workers will not be risking their
jobs. Further, such concerted activities bring the workers closer together and, where
picketing is effectively used, may force an employer to accept an expedited election
under § 8(b) (7). 73 Stat 544 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7) (1964). Cf. Blades
Mfg. Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 561, 565-66 (1963) (refusal to bargain precipitated the
concerted activities).
26 Pollitt, supra note 18, at 211. Professor Pollitt includes in this seventeen per
cent both elections overturned on the basis of a General Shoe unfair election practice
and those invalidated because of unfair labor practices.
27 In fiscal 1965 the figure was forty per cent. 30 NLRB ANN. REP. 195 (1965).
Pollitt, supra note 18, at 212, claims about one-third of the re-runs produce a change
in result
28 General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 128-29 (1948) ; Note, 75 YALE L.J. 805,
809 n.29 (1966) ; Note, 72 YALE L.J. 1243, 1257 (1963).
29 See note 20 srupra. 1966 HAIMuNGs ON TIE NLRA 70, suggests amendment
of § 10(c) to allow double or treble damages to discharged employees when their
discharge was motivated by an anti-union animus. On the same reasoning Congress
might consider specific provisions in § 10(c) for union organizational expenses in an
unsuccessful campaign when there is a demonstrated anti-union animus by the employer. Unions are often a direct vehicle for the expression of employee free choice
and should be encouraged to risk organizational activities.
30 See Pollitt, supra note 18, at 216. See also Section 10(c) Orders 82.
31 Pollitt, supra note 18, at 216.
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election pending determination by the Board, thus avoiding any
stigma of defeat in a prior election. Therefore, to order either a
re-run election or schedule a first election without any further guarantees than those contained in the standard order will usually be
sufficient to effectuate the policies of the act.'
In several recent decisions, however, the Board has recognized
that certain employer unfair labor practices have such an impact
on union organizational activity that the standard order will not serve
as an adequate restorative technique.3 3 In Scott's, Inc., 34 the employer
committed a battery of violations culminating in the discharge, layoff
or transfer of large numbers of employees because of their union
activities.35 The Board found violations of sections 8 (a) (1), 8 (a) (2)
and 8(a) (3). Recognizing that these tactics were designed to destroy
any organizational potential in the unit, the Board declared "that
the serious violations [call] for something more than the usual
remedial action." " To that end the NLRB ordered that letters be
sent to each employee advising him of his organizational rights, that
the union be given access to the plant bulletin boards for a period of
three months and that the employer be required to provide an opportunity for a union
official to deliver a speech to the employees on
3
company time.
The Board has recently demonstrated an encouraging sensitivity
to the effects of some employer unfair labor practices upon the employees' ability to reorganize. The standard NLRB approach to
employer violations in an election campaign-ordering a re-run
election coupled with a cease and desist order and appropriate noticeis solely prospective in scope.38 Prohibiting the employer from again
engaging in certain proscribed activities rarely returns the aggrieved
32See notes 67-75 infra and accompanying text. E.g., Marion Mfg. Co., 161
N.L.R.B. No. 21 (1966), 2 LAB. R.. RE'. (63 L.R.R.M.) 1340 (Oct. 18, 1966);
Brownwood Mfg. Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 921 (1964) ; Lord Baltimore Press, 142 N.L.R.B.
328 (1963). The standard order is a negative remedy, i.e., it forbids commission of
specific acts found to be unfair labor practices. If organizational activity has been
stifled only through passage of time, and the taint of such practices has dissipated,
then renewed organizational activity should revive employee interest. See Pollitt,
supra note 18, at 215.
33 Scott's Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. No. 146 (1966), 2 LAB. REL. REP. (62 L.R.R.M.)
1543 (June 30, 1966) ; J. P. Stevens & Co. (I), 157 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (1966), 2 LAB.
RET. REP. (61 L.R.R.M.) 1437 (March 22, 1966); H. W. Elson Bottling Co., 155
N.L.R.B. No. 63 (1965), 2 LAn. RaL. REP. (60 L.R.R.M.) 1381 (Nov. 10, 1965). See
also Sterling Aluminium Co., 163 N.L.R.B. No. 40 (1967), 2 LAB. Rat. RE.. (64
L.R.R.M.) 1354 (1967).
34 159 N.L.R.B. No. 146 (1966), 2 LAB. EEL. RE. (62 L.R.R.M.) 1543 (June 30,
1966).
35 Id. at 1546-48.
36 Id. at 1549.
37 Ibid. Other less drastic remedies dealing with employer pre-election coercion
are suggested in 1966 HEARINGS ON THE N.L.R.A. 74-75.
38 The order itself does nothing to rekindle employee interest in representation.
See Section 10(c) Orders 82; Note, Employee Choice and Some Problems of Race
and Remedies in Representation Campaigns, 72 YALE L.J. 1243, 1260-62 (1963).
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employees to the status quo ante. 39 Assuming that the employer's
principal reason for engaging in proscribed tactics was to stifle present
and future union activity among his employees, the standard remedy
allows him to accomplish this purpose.4
The real effect of a discriminatory discharge, for example, is never restricted to the employee
directly involved; it discourages those employees remaining in the
plant from further attempts to organize. 41 Even if the Board later
orders reinstatement, other employees are not likely to forget their
colleague's dismissal, a product of his attempt to exercise his section 7
rights.
Another unfair labor practice which may cast a pall over future
elections is resort by the employer to racial propaganda and other
emotionally charged appeals.4" The decision in Dal-Tex Optical Co.4
insures that many of these employer practices will be amenable to a
cease and desist order.44 A cease and desist order, however, cannot
erase the employer's words from the employee's mind. Since section
8(c) does protect employer free speech in certain instances, even the
"total context" approach of Dal-Ter cannot prevent the employer
from recalling, by guarded innuendo, issues effectively planted in the
39 It is argued in Section 10(c) Orders 76-78 that the NLRB is a public agency
enforcing public rights. Although it is the General Counsel, not the private party,
who pursues the complaint through to judgment, the General Counsel does not file
the charge. Hence the Board's action in employer unfair labor practices in general,
and in the case of a discriminatory discharge in particular, concentrates on the harm
done to the employee rather than the broader NLRA policy to protect the employees'
right to free choice. See also PUCINsxI REPORT 2. But see NLRB v. Pant Milling
Co., 360 U.S. 301 (1959); National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940);
NLRB v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 274 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1960) ; Comment, The Charging
Party Before the NLRB: A Private Right it the Public Interest, 32 U. CHI. L. REv.
786 (1965).
40 See Pollitt, supra note 18, at 216. The author lists several violations which
he feels on the basis of comparison of the practice to the re-run results are amenable
to cure by use of the re-run. Among these are: threats to refuse recognition of an
elected union (75% change of result in the re-run); unilateral wage increases just
prior to an election (50% change of result); misstatement of material facts (60%
change of results). Id. at 215. However, there are many unfair labor practices
which taint the results of future elections. See, e.g., Raytheon Co., 160 N.L.R.B.
No. 122 (1966), 2 LAB. RYL. REP. (63 L.R.R.M.) 1180 (Oct. 5, 1966); Heinrich
Motors Inc., 153 N.L.R.B. 1575 (1965) ; Pollitt, supra note 18, at 215.
41

E.g., David Shoe Co., 157 N.L.R.B. No. 15 (1966),

2 LAB. RE.. REP. (61

L.R.R.M.) 1326 (Feb. 25, 1966) ; Orthodontist's Service, 155 N.L.R.B. No. 37 (1965),
2 LAB. REL. REP. (60 L.R.R.M.) 1306 (Oct. 26, 1965); Bridgeport Brass Co., 130
N.L.R.B. 1332 (1961).
42
E.g., Universal Mfg. Corp., 156 N.L.R.B. 1459 (1966). See Sewell Mfg. Co.,
138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962), where an election was set aside on grounds of the employer's
deliberate and sustained appeals to the union's racial policies. In the campaign preceding the re-run the employer did exactly the same thing. The Board set this election
aside, 140 N.L.R.B. 220 (1962), and ordered a third election. See also Allen-Morrison
Sign Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 73 (1962). See generally Pollitt, The National Labor Relations
Board and Race Hate Propagandain Union Organization Drives, 17 STAN. L. RV.
373 (1965); Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination,
62 CoLUm. L. Ray. 563 (1962).
43 137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962).
44 See note 12 supra. If the employer's speech in the context of the organizational
campaign is found to be coercive, the Board can issue a cease and desist order under
§ 10(c).
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employee's mind during the first election campaign. 45 Some restorative
action in addition to the standard Board remedy is necessary to reestablish the status quo ante.
Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 40 demonstrates Board recognition of
the superior communication facilities possessed by the employer in
the normal plant situation.47 In an attempt to rectify this imbalance,
the Board ruled that seven days after the setting of an election date,
the employer must furnish the Regional Director with a list of all
employees eligible to vote, so that, upon request, this list can be
made available to all interested parties. 48 Regardless of the propriety
of this rule,49 it is a clear attempt by the Board to promote contact
with all workers affected by the organizational campaign.5 0 Undoubtedly any expanded opportunity for union communication of this
sort will provide some protection against employer attempts to coerce
employees during the organizational period. 5
45 Section 8(c) expresses a legislative determination that the employer should
be able to speak to his employees on the general merits of unionism. See H.R. REP.
No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1947): "The bill provides that the new Board is
prohibited from using as evidence against an employer . . . any statement that by
its own terms does not threaten force or economic reprisal." (Emphasis added.)
Bok, supra note 10, at 65-106, argues for a policy which allows equal access to the
voters rather than piecemeal prohibition of certain employer statements. See also
Note, 72 YALE L.J. 1243, 1257-61 (1963).
46156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
47
See note 58 infra. See Comment, 80 HAgv. L. REv. 459, 460 (1966), where it is
argued that "to provide adequate means of fully informing the entire electorate, the
channels of communication open to a union must permit it both to reach the maximum
number of voters possible and to convey its message with maximum effectiveness
and persuasiveness to each employee actually reached." The Comment concludes that
the Board in Excelsior was interested primarily in the former. But cf. NLRB v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956), where it is intimated that extension
of communicational opportunities might call for evidence that other adequate means
of reaching the employee electorate were not available.
48 156 N.L.R.B. at 1238 (1966).
49 80 HARv. L. REv. 459, 462 (1966), contends that this rule is a modification,
for the present, of the idea that off-plant communications can never replace superior
on-plant solicitation. 17 SYRACUSE L. Rxv. 762, 764-66 (1966) is not as pessimistic
and sees the rule as a prelude to an expanded Bonwit Teller, 197 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.
1952), rule allowing union speeches on company time in many cases. The same position
is taken by Comment, 54 GEo. L.J. 1434, 1438 (1966).
5o [W]e regard it as the Board's function to conduct elections in which
employees have the opportunity to cast their ballots for or against representation under circumstances that are free not only from interference, restraint,
or coercion violative of the Act, but also from other elements that prevent or
impede a free and reasoned choice. Among the factors that undoubtedly tend
to impede such a choice is a lack of information with respect to one of the
choices available.
Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1238 (1966). See Bok, supra note 10,
at 46, 92; 54 GEo. L.J. 1434, 1437 (1966).
51 The assumption is that the employee, having heard both sides, is less likely
to be swayed by employer threats or coercion. But see Comment, 80 HARv. L. REv.
459, 462 n.17 (1966). It is suggested that mailed campaign literature is likely to
have little effect or impact on employee sentiment, citing J. KLAPPER, THE EFFcrs
See also BAKER, BALL.ENTINE & TRUE,
OF MASS COMMUNICATION 106-09 (1960).
TRANSMITTING INFORaTION THROUGH MANAGEMENT AND UNION CHANNELS 42, 43,
84, 95 (1949), cited in Note, Union Right of Reply to Employer On-the-Job Speeches:
The NLRB Takes a New Approach, 61 YALE L.J. 1066, 1074 n.33 (1952). For a
detailed picture of an organizing campaign and the different pressures exerted on
the workers, see KARsH, Dign OF A SmuR 29-45 (1958).
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If, at the outset, the Board is concerned with balancing communicational opportunities, should it be less concerned with the effects
of employer unfair labor practices on the union's organizational
campaign? Since the policy of the act favors free discussion on the
relative merits of unionism, the Board should evolve restorative techniques which will have the effect of promoting such discussion.52 In
unfair labor practice cases, the employer, by overt action, has attempted to destroy employee free choice; certainly the Board then
should be prepared to expand communicational opportunities to dissipate any lingering coercive effects on the employees' rights.53
The value of the restorative techniques suggested in Scott's
is apparent. For instance, requiring the employer to notify individually each of his employees that he will no longer engage in certain
election tactics insures that all workers involved in the re-run will be
apprised that the employer has violated the law and that enforcement
authorities have acted to cure these violations."4 Other suggested
remedies in Scott's include union access to the company bulletin board
and provisions for a speech to be delivered by a union representative
on company premises during the normal working day."
The right to give such a "captive audience" speech on the
company premises was designed to insure that the union has an
effective forum in which to present the advantages of organization to
employees. 6 This technique had previously been employed by
the Board only in cases where the union's communicational opportunities in an organizational campaign were limited by certain
This action was taken to
peculiarities in the employer's business.
2 See notes 57-58 infra.
Section 10(c) Orders 82. See 1966 HEARINGS oN THE NLRA 74-79; Address
by Chairman McCulloch, Federal Bar Association Convention, in 30 U.S.L. WEEK
2133, 2134 (Sept. 19, 1961), cited in Section 10(c) Orders 81 n.118, 83 n.122. See
generally McCulloch, An Evaluation of the Remedies Available to the NLRB, 15
LAB. L.J. 755 (1964).
54 The remedial technique provides the first necessity for effective communication
-allowing the message to reach the maximum number of voters. See NLRB v. United
Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357, 364 (1958), where the Court indicated that the Board
should examine union communicational opportunities. See Note, Employee Choice
and Some Problems of Race and Remedies in Representation Campaigns, 72 YALE L.J.
1243, 1258-59 (1963).
55159 N.L.R.B. No. 146 (1966), 2 LAB. RmL. REP. (62 L.R.R.M.) at 1549;
accord, J. P. Stevens & Co. (I), 157 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (1966), 2 LAB. REL. REp.
(61 L.R.R.M.) at 1438; H. W. Elson Bottling Co., 155 N.L.R.B. No. 63 (1965),
2 LAB. REL. REP. (60 L.R.R.M.) at 1382.
56 As the [employer] violated the rights of those employees who had not yet
had a chance to formulate their desires with regard to representation as well
as the rights of those who had done so, we deem it appropriate that employees be afforded further opportunity to engage in organizational efforts.
Scott's, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. No. 146 (1966), 2 LAB. RIM REP. (62 L.R.R.M.) 1549.
(Emphasis added.)
57 MotoeyWard & Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 846 (1964), enforced in Part, 339
F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1965), and May Dep't Stores, 136 N.L.R.B. 797 (1962), enforcemtent denied, 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1963), overruling Livingston Shirt; 107 N.L.R.B.
400 (1953), and reinstating the Bonwit Teller doctrine in cases where the employer
53

EMPLOYER PRE-ELECTION COERCION

insure that the employees have sufficient access to the disadvantaged
union to make an intelligent electoral decision."
Adoption of this
communicational technique in fact situations typified by Scott's demonstrates the Board's recognition that some employer election conduct
effectively stifles future employee expression and that a meaningful rerun can be conducted only after communications between the union and
the plant employees have been re-established.
Restorative techniques do not end with those remedies suggested
in Scott's. Increased solicitation and distribution of union literature
on plant premises, made possible by a relaxation of normal Board
respect for employer no-solicitation and distribution rules, might be
used to remedy employer violations. 9 Other restorative possibilities
include dispatching Board personnel to the affected plants to supervise
the conduct of the participants during the campaign preceding the rerun election 60 or ordering the employer to provide a forum in which
members of the Regional Director's office could explain the reasons
for the re-run to the affected employees. 1
was entitled to a privileged "broad no solicitation rule." May Dep't Stores, 136
N.L.R.B. at 802, stated:
The place of work is the one place where all employees involved are sure to be
together. Thus it is the one place where they can all discuss with each other
the advantages and disadvantages of organization, and lend each other support
and encouragement Such full discussion lies at the very heart of the organizational rights guaranteed by the Act, . . . It is only where opportunities
for such discussion are available . . . that the election procedures established
in the Act can be expected to product [sic] the peaceful resolution of representation questions on the basis of a free and informed choice.
See also Note, Employee Choice and Some Problems of Race and Remedies in Representation Campaigns, 72 Ysax L.J. 1243, 1260 (1963). But see General Electric Co.,
156 N.L.R.B. No. 112 (1966), 2 LAB. REL. REP. (61 L.R.R.M.) 1222 (Feb. 4, 1966),
where the Board refused to go beyond the limits of May Dep't Stores which turned
on the breadth of the no-solicitation rules.
58 See Note, 61 YAr L.J. 1066, 1074-78 (1952), describing various alternative
methods of union access to the employees. See also Comment, 14 U. CHl. L. REv.
104, 108-09 (1946), emphasizing the employer's communicational advantage in the
election campaign.
59
Section 10(c) Orders 82. For a general discussion of no solicitation rules and
no distribution rules, see Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation
Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. Rzv. 38, 92-106
(1964).
See also Note, No-Solicitation and No-Distribution Rules: Prestumptive
Validity and Discrimination, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 1049 (1964).
0
OSection 10(c) Orders 82. But cf. J. J. Hagerty, Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 633
(1962), vwodified stb nom., Local 138, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB,
321 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1963). The Board found repeated discrimination in favor of
union members at a union hiring hall. In an attempt to halt such practices, it ordered
the regional director to supervise the formulation of a non-discriminatory hiring and
referral system. The Court of Appeals refused to enforce this portion of the Board's
order-presumably it interjected Board personnel into the collective bargaining process.
The Board's special authority to conduct elections, however, might provide sufficient
statutory authorization to interject itself in the present type of case. See Peerless
Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953) ; General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
61 An interesting use of communicational devices is suggested in Note, Employee
Choice and Some Problems of Race and Remedies in Representation Campaigns,
72 YALE L.J. 1243, 1261 (1963). The author suggests Board adaptation of election
primary pamphlets used in some states. The technique suggested involves distribution
of a pamphlet outlining the views for and against unionism prepared by the opposing
parties. Adopting this idea to the re-run situation, the Board might forbid all but
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The Board has limited the Scott's-type remedy to serious employer
violations.' Although the Board has not defined "serious" violations,
it appears that several proscribed practices coupled with demonstrable
employer anti-union animus are envisaged.' Utilizing the employer's
attitude as a criterion for determining whether the Board should order
a response beyond its standard remedy seems inappropriate. While
the employer's motivation may be crucial in determining whether or
not an unfair labor practice has been committed," the effect of the
violation upon the employees' rights should be the sole guide in
determining appropriate relief. 5
The Board, by categorizing various unfair labor practices as
"serious" or "technical" violations, could do much to correct present
inadequacies in its remedial scheme. Studies are available which forecast re-run results when held in the wake of various types of employer
tactics."6 The Board should take advantage of these findings and, if
necessary, commission further studies to discover which employer
tactics continue to impede employee section 7 rights after issuance of
the standard Board remedy. These tactics should be adjudged "serious" violations and should give rise to a presumption that the employees have been sufficiently coerced to necessitate certain restorative
7 Judging the injury
action in addition to the standard Board order.
official pamphlets in the campaign preceding the re-run and might bar employer
"captive audience" speeches and other advantageous techniques which he might otherwise possess, to insure employee free choice. But see J. J.Hagerty, Inc., 139 N.L.

R.B. 633 (1962).
C2159 N.L.R.B. No.146 (1966), 2 LAB. REt RE. (62 L.R.R.M.) at 1549. See
also J.P. Stevens & Co. (I), 157 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (1966), 2 LAE. RET. REP. (61
L.R.R.M.) at 1438; H. W. Elson Bottling Co., 155 N.L.R.B. No. 63 (1965), 2 LAB.
Rs.. REP. (60 L.R.R.M.) at 1381.
eaE.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. (I), 157 N.L.RB. No. 90 (1966), 2 LAB. REL. REP.
(61 L.R.R.M.) 1437, 1438 (March 22, 1966):
[C]onventional reinstatement, backpay, and posting of notice requirements
for 8(a) (3) and (1) violations are not completely adequate to undo the
effect of the nassive and deliberate unfair labor practices committed by [the
employer) in its successful efforts to frustrate organization by its employees.
(Emphasis added.) The two criteria may not be distinct, for the Board can infer
motive from acts. See note 73 infra.
6 Compare Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 162 F2d 435 (7th Cir. 1947),
Sims, Inc. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 21 (1964). See generally Getman,
'with Burnip and
Section 8(a)(3 ) of the NLRA and the Efforts to Insulate Free Employee Choice,
32 U. Cm.L.REv. 735 (1965).
6 E.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 192-94 (1941); NLRB
v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261, 265 (1938).
66 See Pollitt, NLRB Re-Run Elections: A Study, 41 N.C.L. REv. 209 (1963).
An example of Board projects to study the effectiveness of its remedies is Ross, The
Labor Law in Action -An Analysis of the Administrative Process Under the TaftHartley Act, 4 CCH LAB. L. RF'. 8039 (Nov. 11, 1966) (analysis of the Board's
remedies for § 8(a) (5)violations).
0 The use of presumptions in this area, developed through case adjudication,
should simplify remedial problems faced by the Board. For other implementations
of the presumptive technique in the labor area, see Payton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B.
828, 843-44 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
730 (1944). See also Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 849
(1962); Star-Brite Indus., Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 1008 (1960). See generally Note,
No-Solicitation and No-Distribution Rules: Presumptive Validity and Discrimination,
112 U. PA. L. REv. 1049 (1964).
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to employee organizational potential by reference to the employer
violation seems to be the most effective way to achieve simplicity in
the remedial area. It can reasonably be assumed that the more
virulent the employer violation, the greater the impact on the organizational potential of the affected unit. Though ultimately it is the
impact upon organization which the Board is attempting to restore,
evidentiary difficulties make direct determination impractical.6" Thus,
an inferential approach should be adopted-impact on organization
potential inferred from the seriousness of the unfair labor practice.
Such an inference should be one the Board can justify upon the basis
of its expertise; 69 since the presumptions will be rebuttable, no difficulty with doctrines invalidating a per se approach should be
encountered. 70
This presumptive technique will insure that violations whose
effects inherently persist past the first election, e.g., massive discriminatory discharges or blatant racial appeals, will be subject to some
additional countervailing restorative action.7' By looking to the facts
of each case, some flexibility in ordering restorative action may be
preserved within the basically rigid superstructure created through
use of presumptions; problems of remedy selection can be simplified,
yet responsiveness maintained. Employer tactics not shown to have
demonstrable effects on future elections may be classified as "technical"
violations with a consequent presumption of a sufficiently low level
of coercion that the standard Board order should be effective.
The creation of presumptions also permits a more realistic balancing of employee organizational rights with traditional employer
proprietary interests. The restorative techniques described are not
required of law-abiding employers since they often interfere with
legitimate proprietary interests. 72 However, when the employer em68 The determination of impact here would be especially difficult in view of the
thousands of cases the Board is required to deal with each year. See, e.g., 30 NLRB
ANN. RaP. 1 (1965). "[I]n the 30 . . . [years of administration of the NLRA, the
Board] has handled more than 200,000 unfair labor practice cases affecting hundreds
of thousands of persons

..

.

."

In the past 7 years the Board has handled 95,000

unfair labor practice cases. Ibid. Under such circumstances, it would be impossible
for the Board to compile detailed findings as to loss of organizational potential in a
given unit. The suggested system in fact uses empirical data to create separate categories where certain effects on employee organizational potential are presumed. This
appears to be a more rational approach than that presently employed by the Board
-the use of labels without proper definition. See, e.g., Scott's Inc., 159 N.L.R.B.
No. 146, 2 LAD. EL. RE'. (62 L.R.R.M.) 1543 (June 30, 1966). See Sectiont 10(c)
Orders 81, criticizing the Board's failure to explain its operable standards.
60 See Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 45-50 (1954); Republic

Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 800 (1945).

70 In cases where the Board has attempted to use inflexible standards in determining whether an unfair labor practice has been committed the courts have refused
to enforce the orders. See Local 357, Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 672-76
(1961); NLRB v. Lorben Corp., 345 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1965).

71 S
FRIENDLY, THE FDER.AL AD iIsTRAT=vE AGFNcIEs: THE NEED POR BETTER
DaMNIToN oF STANDARDS 36-52 (1962).
See generally Peck, The Atrophied Rule-

Making
Powers of the National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961).
72
Compare NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357 (1958); NLRB v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956) (balancing test applied to determine
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barks on a course of conduct which brings him in conflict with the
law, his previously valid proprietary objections should not hinder the
Board's equally valid remedial objectives. The use of a presumption
where "serious" violations have been committed would allow the
employer to protect his proprietary rights, but only where he can
demonstrate to the Board that his violations are not likely to harm
future organizational attempts by his employees.7" Where "technical"
violations of the act are present, the standard Board remedy should be
sufficient, absent a showing by the union or another interested party
that the affected unit's potential for organization has been noticeably
74

damaged.

THE BARGAINING ORDER

The bargaining order has become an increasingly popular remedy
of the Board. 75 Much of this increase has been produced by the
overruling of Aiello Dairy Farms7 in Bernet Foam Products
Board's
77
Co.

The Board in Bernel Foam held that the union no longer must

choose between proceeding with an election or filing an unfair labor
practice charge under section 8(a) (5)."' Prior to Bernel Foam, if the
union claimed to represent a majority of the workers in a particular
unit and participated in an election after an alleged refusal to recognize
on the part of the employer, the union was estopped from challenging the results of that election by filing a section 8(a) (5) charge.
The Bernet rule is indicative of an increased willingness on the part
of the Board to expand the use of this effective remedial tool.
whether union's need for greater channels of communication outweighed employer's
property interests), with Fafnir Bearing Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 846 (1964), enforced,
362 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1966); Montgomery Ward and Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 846 (1964),
enforced in part, 339 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1965). See Bok, supra note 59, at 57. For
discussion of the relationship between employer rights and the union's organizational
needs, see Gould, Union Organizatiowal Rights and the Conwept of "Quasi-Piblic"
Property, 49 MINN. L. REV. 506 (1965); Comment, 54 GEo. L.J. 1434 (1966);
Comment, 54 COLum. L. REv. 632 (1954).
73 The presumption here does not deprive the employer of his proprietary rights
but simply subordinates them to the overriding policies of the NLRA. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Lexington Chair Co., 361 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1966). The court in
Lexington also used a presumptive technique to infer motive from acts. Id. at 294 n.10.
74 Though it was earlier contended that direct demonstration of the impact on
organizational potential is difficult, it does not seem unfair to require proof of impact
to demonstrate that the standard remedy will not be effective. Given the less serious

nature of the employer's acts, to rebut the presumption the impact should be stark
and thus more easily demonstrated. Furthermore, the union has particular access
to such information.
75 See Note, Refusal-To-Recognize Charges Under Section 8(a) (5) of the NLRA:
Card Checks and Employee Free Choice, 33 U. Cal.L. Ray. 387, 388 n.n.7-8 (1966):
"The Board conducted 7,355 elections in fiscal year 1962, 7,240 in fiscal year 1963, 7,309
in fiscal year 1964, and 7,824 in fiscal year 1965!' During that same period the Board
issued 157, 165, 175 and 236 bargaining orders respectively. Id. at 388 n.8.
76 110 N.L.thB. 1365 (1954).
77 146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964). The Bernel Foam rule has been tested and upheld
in several circuits. See NLRB v. Frank Varney Co., 359 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1966) ;
NLRB v. S.N.C. Mfg. Co., 352 F.2d 361 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (per curiam), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 901 (1965) ; Colson Corp., 347 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1965).
78 146 N.L.R.B. at 1283-84.
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The bargaining order is a powerful remedy-it assumes that
the union is the lawful representative of the employees and compels
the employer to bargain with the union upon request. 9 The remedy
is especially significant in cases of employer pre-election coercion.'
When an employer refuses to recognize an asserted union majority,
pre-election coercion will form a basis for attacking his good faith
belief that the union lacked a majority.8 ' Even in the absence of a
demand for recognition by the union, the Board has ordered the employer to bargain where the union has shown that it represented a
majority of the employees in the unit at sometime prior to the comIn these cases, the Board is
mission of the unfair labor practices.'
seeking to restore the relative positions of the parties prior to the
employer's violation.'
The Board has the power to issue a bargaining order in an appropriate case; and it should exercise this power frequently when an
employer violates section 8(a)(1) during an organizational campaign. The argument that employee free choice is compromised when
the Board "takes matters into its own hands" is not persuasive when
one considers the difficulty of returning the parties to the status quo
Since the union could claim a
in an organizational situation.'
majority before the commission of the unfair labor practices, it is
difficult to accept the contention that the union's failure to demand
recognition in section 8(a) (1) cases should necessitate a re-run election in cases where the employer made clear attempts to coerce the
employees' freedom of choice,) If the employees, upon appropriate
7-9E.g., NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); NLRB v. Mexia Textile Mills,
Inc., 339 U.S. 563 (1950) ; Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944) ; NLRB
v. P. Lorillard Co., 314 U.S. 512 (1942). See Note, Employee Choice and Some
Problems of Race and Remedies in Representation Campaigns, 72 YALE L.J. 1243,
1256 (1963). See also FoRoscH, LABOR LAw 823-24 (2d ed. 1965).
8° E.g., Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 703-04 (1944).
81NLRB v. Gotham Shoe Mfg. Co., 359 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1966); Irving Air
Chute Co. v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1965) ; NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.,
341 F.2d 750 (6th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Nelson Mfg. Co., 326 F.2d 397, 399-400
(6th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Decker, 296 F.2d 338, 341 (8th Cir. 1961); NLRB v.
Stow Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 900, 904-05 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 964 (1955).
Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
914 (1951). But cf. NLRB v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 346 F.2d 936 (5th
Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Bedford-Nugent Corp., 317 F.2d 861 (7th Cir. 1963); Strydel
Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 114 (1966), 2 LAB. REi. REP. (61 L.R.R.M.) 1230 (1966).
82NLRB v. Delight Bakery, Inc., 353 F.2d 344 (6th Cir. 1965); Summit Mining
Corp. v. NLRB, 260 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1958); NLRB v. Caldarera, 209 F.2d 265
(8th Cir. 1954); H. D. Holmes Co. v. NLRB, 179 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1950).
But cf. NLRB v. Flomatic Corp., 347 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1965).
83 See NLRB v. Divigard Baking Co., 367 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1966) (per curiam);
Colson Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1965). The rationale is that but
for the unfair labor practice, the union would have won the election; a bargaining
order thus restores the parties to the status quo ante, when the union represented a
majority.
84 See Comment, 19 VAND. L. REv. 512, 514-15 (1966) ; Section 10(c) Orders 81.
85 See, e.g., Steelworkers v. NLRB, 2 LAB. REL. REP.

(64 L.R.R.M.)

2650,

2651-52 (D.C. Cir. March 24, 1967); NLRB v. Delight Bakery, Inc., 353 F.2d 344,
346-47 (6th Cir. 1965). But cf. NLRB v. Flomatic Corp., 347 F.2d 74, 78-80 (2d
Cir. 1965).
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showing, do not wish to be represented by a particular union, the
Board will order an election.. 6
In view of the versatility and effectiveness of the bargaining
order, inquiry is immediately suggested into the possibility of issuing
one even when the union cannot demonstrate that it once possessed
a majority of the employees in the affected unit. 7 Adopting such a
policy arguably would "force men into unions and into dealing with
their employers through unions contrary to the employees' own
wishes." " However, an argument based on the employees' section 7
rights not to join a union 8 is "hardly dispositive," since, as Professor
Bok points out, "unions .

.

.

[secure] bargaining rights in many

cases without the support of a majority of the employees." o
The Board, in several recent cases, rejected issuance of a bargaining order where the union was unable to demonstrate the existence
of a majority sometime prior to the election."
The Labor Board
declared:
We are not, however, persuaded by the union's argument
that a bargaining order is warranted here. It is possible
that but for the .

.

.

[employer's] unlawful conduct the

union might ultimately have attained majority status ....
86 NLRA § 9(c), 61 Stat. 144 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1964),
allows the employer or the employees to petition for an election if in doubt as to the
union's
87 majority. See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 100-01 (1954).
1t is ill-advised to attach the significance which the Board does to a fleeting
indication that a majority once supported the union. To require, as a condition for
issuance of a bargaining order, a showing that a majority existed some time prior
to the commission of the unfair labor practice is unsound policy. One result of such
a requirement is that unions may be encouraged to conduct covert organizational
drives, since the longer the employer is unaware of the campaign, the greater become
the union's chances of gaining a majority of signed authorization cards. By placing
a premium on the campaign "blitz," employees are left with little or no opportunity
for discussion of the issues and are deprived of the employer's views. The authorizations obtained may therefore reflect an employee decision based upon inadequate
information. If the employer then commits an unfair labor practice, the union may
be rewarded for its secrecy and crash program with a bargaining order. For a
critique of union authorization card reliability in an election situation, see Lesnick,
Establishment of Bargaining Rights Without an NLRB Election, 65 MicH. L. REzv.
851, 856-58 (1967) ; Note, 33 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 387 (1966) ; Note, Union Authorization
Cards,
75 YALE L.J. 805, 823-28 (1966). See also Bok, supra note 59, at 134 n.269.
88 Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 698 (1944) (Rutledge, J.
dissenting), cited in Bok, supra note 59, at 134.
89 NLRA § 7, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964), provides:
Employers shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have
9the right to refrain from any or all such activities. . . . (Emphasis added.)
0 Bok, supra note 59, at 134. If this is so, other competing policies contained
in § 7 of the Act must be weighed. See text accompanying notes 96-98 infra. See,
e.g., Garwin Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 664, 666 (1965), enforced in part sub nom., Local
57, Garment Workers v. NLRB, 2 LAB. REL. REP. (64 L.R.R.M.) 2159 (D.C. Cir.
Jan. 11, 1967). See also note 80 supra.
91 Scotts, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. No. 146 (1966), 2 LAB. Rum. REP. (62 L.R.R.M.)
1543 (June 30, 1966) ; J. P. Stevens & Co. (I), 157 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (1966), 2 LAB.
REL. RzE.
(61 L.R.R.M.) 1437 (March 22, 1966); H. W. Elson Bottling Co., 155
N.L.R.B. 714 (Nov. 10, 1965).
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[H]owever . . . in consideration of the majority principle
in Section 9(a) of the Act, we are not convinced that the
policies of the Act require or even permit the issuance of a
bargaining order here. 2
The Board in Scott's, Inc. 3 completely sidestepped the crucial
question-resolution of the two conflicting aims of section 7-by
stating that the majority principle in section 9(a) precluded the
issuance of the bargaining order when the union could not demonstrate
that it ever represented a majority of the employees."
In view of the
legislative history of section 9(a), the Board's position is difficult to
understand. Section 9(a) reflects a policy of majority rule; once
selected, a union becomes the sole bargaining agent in a unit to the
exclusion of other interested minority representatives? 5 It was never
conceived as placing an absolute limit on the Board's ability to remedy
employer violations.
Section 7 embodies two conflicting policies. It gives to employees "the right to self organization .

.

. for the purpose of col-

lective bargaining" " yet affirms the right of these same employees "to
refrain from any or all such activities." 9 Positing the employer's
virulent unfair labor practice, the Board must choose between redressing the blow to employee organizational activities and insuring that
their right to nonorganization is protected. Since section 10(c) directs
the Board to take such affirmative action as will effectuate the policies
of the act, the NLRB must decide whether on balance its orders will
implement the purposes for which the act was created s It is clear
that the emphasis of section 7 was intended to be on employee freedom
of choice; '9 however, the Board has not shown sufficient appreciation
for organizational considerations in its balancing process. Flagrant
and repeated employer violations of the act may so coerce the affected
92
Scott's, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. No. 146 (1966), 2 LAB. Rm. REP. (62 L.R.R.M.)
1543, 1549 (June 30, 1966). To support this conclusion, the Board cited H. W. Elson
Bottling Co. and J. P. Stevens & Co. (I), mipra note 91. See Lesnick, .spra note 87,
at 859-63 where the role of the bargaining order in the remedial scheme of the Board
is examined.

93 159 N.L.R.B. No. 146 (1966), 2 LAB.
1966).
94Id.

REL.

REP. (62 L.R.R.M.) 1543 (June 30,

at 1549.

!DSee S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1935); 79 CONG. REc. 7571
(1935) (remarks of Senator Wagner); 79 CONG. REc. 7672 (1935) (remarks of
Senator Hastings). The principle of § 9(a) dates back to the decision of Houde
Engineering Corp., Decisions of N.L.R.B., July-Dec. 1934, No. 12, at 35 (1934).
9o6NLRA § 7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
9761 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
98NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 348 (1954),; see Phelps
Dodge9 Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 192-95 (1941).

V E.g., H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 38-40 (1947); H.R. REP. No.

972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1935). For a brief analysis of the freedom guaranteed employees, see Summers, Freedom of Association and Comfndsory Unionismn
in Sweden and the United States, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 647, 694-95 (1964). See also
Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 HAv. L. REzv. 1,

4445 (1947).
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employees in the exercise of their rights that, although the communicational techniques suggested earlier '0 be utilized, a meaningful
expression of employee sentiment can no longer be realistically expected. In such a situation the employees should be given an opportunity to observe the union functioning as their barganing agent so they
will be able to form an intelligent opinion on the merits of organization.
Several questions arise when use of such a drastic remedy is contemplated. First, at what point can the Board insist that less drastic
restorative techniques will not guarantee employee free choice?
Second, should the remedy be decreed in all cases where the Board is
pessimistic that communicational remedies alone will not ensure employee free choice? Third, what, if any, safeguards are necessary to
protect employee freedom not to organize?
The restorative techniques previously suggested 101 should prove
sufficient in the vast majority of cases. However, the Board is commanded to fashion remedies effectuating the policies of the act.' 2
Where the employer's violations are sufficiently serious so that it is
likely that a majority of the employees have been intimidated to such
an extent that a dispassionate choice cannot be realistically expected,
the effectiveness of communicational approaches is questionable. The
severity of the practices may also indicate that the employer is disposed to commit future violations, further lessening the efficacy of the
communicational remedies. 3 The case of J. P. Stevens & Co. (II) 104
is illustrative of both these points.
In J. P. Stevens & Co. (I) 105 the Board ordered that several
communicational techniques be employed to erase the effects of serious
100 See notes 57-61 supra and accompanying text.
101 Ibid.

10 2 Both the Board and the courts have as their concern the duty to insure that
every unfair labor practice be met with an effective remedy. See, e.g., Town and
Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1029 (1962): "[I]t seems obvious, that in
passing the Act, Congress did not engage in the empty gesture of creating rights
without parallel remedies." See also NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304
U.S. 333, 348 (1938): "[T]he relief which the statute empowers the Board to
grant is to be adapted to the situation which calls for redress." However, the NLRB
has also recognized that the remedy which it orders might be ineffective in remedying
the adverse effects of particular unfair labor practice. See, e.g., Garwin Corp., 153
N.L.R.B. 664, 682 (1965) (report of the trial examiner).
103 Of course the Board could issue a broad cease and desist order because such
violations would go to the heart of employee § 7 rights. See, e.g., May Dep't Stores
Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376, 390-92 (1945). However, if the employer continued his
unfair labor practices, the Board would be forced to initiate contempt proceedings.
These proceedings have been singularly ineffective, for they demand clear and convincing evidence when a civil contempt citation is sought, e.g., NLRB v. Lambert,
250 F.2d 801, 803 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. NLRB, 137
F.2d 77, 79 (8th Cir. 1943), or proof beyond a reasonable doubt when a criminal
contempt citation is sought, e.g., NLRB v. Int'l Hod Carriers, 228 F.2d 589, 591
(2d Cir. 1955). The employer normally is sufficiently sophisticated to confine his
unfair labor practices in the re-run to those acts equivocal enough to avoid a finding
of contempt. At the same time his activities may effectively coerce employees whose
organizational aspirations were originally dashed by his previous unfair labor practices.
104 163 N.L.R.B. No. 24 (1967), 2 LAB. REL. RFP. (64 L.R.R.M.) 1289 (March 6,
1967).
105 157 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (1966), 2 LAB. REL. REP. (61 L.R.R.M.) 1437 (March
22, 1966).
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employer violations 106 However, the company, neither chastened nor
deterred, again committed serious unfair labor practices calculated to
minimize the impact of the communicational remedies decreed by the
Board.'" The Board's reaction in J. P. Stevens & Co. (II) was to
expand the scope of the previously ordered remedies by granting the
union's request for access to the company's list of its employees.'
Such endless escalation in the communicational area, however, is not
likely to protect the affected employees' right to a free choice. The
employer in this case has already demonstrated a propensity to negate
Board attempts to increase communicational opportunities, suggesting
both an intimidated employee electorate and likely future violations.
The Board should not have to await the results of a communicational
approach when the quantum of evidence available at the first determination suggests these two factors. In view of the deleterious effects
upon employee freedom if the Board defers this finding pending
determination of the effectiveness of a communicational approach, 09
immediate relief through use of the bargaining order should be
considered.
The Board should not, however, issue a bargaining order in all
cases where future violations are considered likely, but should limit
the order to cases where the union would have achieved majority
status but for the employer's violations. Two policies prompt this
limitation. The Board is avowedly attempting to return the parties
to the status quo. Although this is a nebulous phrase, the Board's
remedial solution is not without standards."' Rewarding a union with
-06 The Board ordered the employer to mail copies of the Board's notice endorsed

by a representative of the employer to each of its employees in North and South
Carolina, to give the union access to plant bulletin boards for a one year period and
to convene the employees during working time for the purpose of reading the Board
notice to them. J. P. Stevens & Co. (I), 157 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (1966), 2 LAB. REL.
Rn'. (61 L.R.R.M.) at 1438. But see NLRB v. Laney & Duke Co., 2 LaB. REl.. REP.
(63 L.R.R.M.) 2552 (5th Cir. Dec. 6, 1966). A Board order directing an employer
to read a similar notice where the violations were less blatant was refused enforcement on the ground that the remedy was designed to humiliate the employer rather
than effectuate the policies of the act
107 The Board found that over the period covered by the two J. P. Stevens cases

the employer discharged 88 employees for union activities and made over 30 threats
of reprisal and promises of benefit to employees. Other numerous § 8(a) (1) violations are also detailed. See J. P. Stevens & Co. (II), 163 N.L.R.B. No. 24, 2 LA.
Rat. REP. (64 L.R.R.M.) 1289, 1290 (March 6, 1967).
108 Id. at 1290.
109 At least two such effects are clear. First, the employer will be given a further
opportunity to coerce his employees. Secondly, the passage of time alone is destructive
where a union is attempting to mount an organizational drive. See notes 14-25 supra
and accompanying text.
11o The Board is commanded by § 10(c) to order remedies which effectuate the

purposes of the Act; therefore, the term "status quo" has no statutory significance.
It is used by the Board to describe the function of its particular remedies. The
Board has thus used the term when describing a remedy which placed the union in
a position which it would have occupied but for the employer's violations. E.g., Town
& Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1029 (1962), enforced, 316 F.2d 846 (5th
Cir. 1963). The Board has also used the term to describe returning the parties to
their respective positions before commission of the unfair labor practice. E.g., Jacob
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majority status simply because the employer had committed violations
and was adjudged likely to commit further violations, could only be
viewed as an attempt to punish the employer, thereby exceeding the
Board's remedial powers.-"'
Secondly, a bargaining relationship
should not be established unless it has a reasonable chance of success." 2
If a large percentage, though not a majority, of the employees originally supported the union, then the union may have sufficient grassroots support to bargain effectively with a hostile employer." 3 Intimidated employees will thus have an opportunity to observe a union
in action," 4 and the Board will foster an uncoerced decision by those
employees "who [have] not yet had a chance to formulate their desires
with regard to representation ..
Though exact measurement is impossible, the Board should be able
to determine if the union would have achieved a majority. A starting
point for the Board's inquiry might be an examination of the union's
authorization cards." 6 Other indicia of the union's organizational
H. KJotz, 13 N.L.R.B. 746, 778 (1939), modified, 29 N.L.R.B. 14 (1941). The
Supreme Court has stated the Board's function is "to put aright matters the unfair
labor practice set awry." Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S.
651, 658 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring).
11E.g., Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 \U.S. 651, 655
(1961); Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 11-12 (1940). Se Consolidated
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 235-36 (1938); Comnent, 89 U. PA. L. REV.
527-29 (1941).
"12See Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 705 (1944), where the Court
seemed to weigh the chances of success in granting this type of relief.
113 It is difficult to make an exact determination of the amount of grassroots

support necessary for a union to bargain effectively with the employer. Certainly,
at some time prior to the unfair labor practices the union should have had sufficient
authorizations to seek an election. See note 117 infra. Though it is dubious whether
the union retairis such support following the employer's acts, the authorizations are
indicative of some showing of interest on the part of the employees and the Board
should give recognition to this fact. There is bound to be some residue of union
sympathy among the employees and, considering the fa~t that the Board must find
that the union would have achieved a majority but for the employer's violations, the
union should be permitted the opportunity to attempt bargaining with the employer.
114 After the issuance of a bargaining order the employer would be required to
bargain in good faith with the union as though it were the elected representative.
For an excellent article on the duty of an employer to bargain, see Cox, The Duty
to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HAv. L. REv. 1401 (1958). If the union is sufficiently
strong to represent its employees effectively, those who were intimidated in the election campaign will be able to judge how ably the union protects their interests.
115 Scott's Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. No. 146 (1966), 2 LAB. Rmr.. REP. (62 L.R.R.M.)
at 1548.
116 Authorization cards have long been the primary method of determining if a
union was in fact the representative of a majority of the employees when a section
8(a) (5) issue was litigated. Some doubt has been cast on the reliability of the cards.
NLRB v. Gotham Shoe Mfg. Co., 359 F.2d 684, 693-99 (2q1 Cir. 1966) (Timbers, J.,
separate opinion). See Note, 75 YALE L.J. 805, 823-28 (1966), where the author
suggests "the absence of secrecy makes threats of wage and seniority reprisals and
promises to waive initiation fees more than mere predictions." Id. at 827. At the
present time, the Board refuses to examine the reliability of the authorization cards
because of the difficulty of assessing whether subsequent withdrawals and repudiations were motivated by employer pressure on the employees after discovery of the
organizational campaign. See Lesnick, vitpra note 87, at 856. Authorization cards
are generally not as reliable as an election, see Note, 33 U. CHi. L. REv. 387, 390-91
(1966), citing McCulloch, speech by Chairman McCulloch, 1962 PROCEEDINGS,
SEcrIoN OF LABOR RELATiONs LAw, A m Cx BAR AssociATiON 14-17, and are
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progress might be the rate at which it obtained authorization cards
prior to the violations, and the workers' general support of the union
gleaned from testimony before the trial examiner or other Board personnel. Though of lesser probative value, the Board also could
examine the success the complaining union or similar unions have
obtained in comparable situations. Some absolute minimum criteria
could also be developed to protect the employees' section 7 rights not
to organize. The Board thus could require the union to demonstrate
as a condition to the issuance of the suggested bargaining order, that
at some time during the campaign it was authorized by at least
thirty per cent of the unit." 7
Since it has been posited that a majority of the employees have
never indicated approval of the designated union, a standard bargaining
order would not. be appropriate. Modifications of the standard bargaining order must be made to preserve the employees' rights to reject
organization in the future. The parties should therefore be ordered
to bargain only for a reasonable time and any contract which is
negotiated by the parties should not act as a bar for longer than a
one-year period."" During this trial period the union should be prohibited from negotiating a union security agreement."
Finally, to
obtain a reliable expression of employee sentiment, an election should
be ordered either after the bargaining order has been in effect for a
reasonable time or after a negotiated agreement has been in effect
for one year.'
Under the graduated system proposed-standard re-run order,
re-run plus conditions and finally a modified bargaining order-the
usually employed only where the employer does not have a good faith doubt as to
the union's majority or where a § 8(a) (1) violation has been committed. E.g.,
NLRB v. Gotham Shoe Mfg. Co., 359 F.2d at 686-87; NLRB v. Delight Bakery, Inc.,
353 F.2d 344 (6th Cir. 1965). Though an inexact indicator, they can be useful to
determine whether a substantial "hard core" of union supporters is present. If a
"hard core" of support is found, the Board should issue the suggested modified bargaining order. See notes 119-21 infra and accompanying text.
"17 See Bok, mepra note 59, at 138.
The Board has adopted an administrative
guideline that "substantial interest" in union representation normally exists where
about 30% of the employees have signed authorization cards. See Cox & BoX, CASES
ON LABOR LAW 311-12 (6th ed. 1965).
118 Cf. Garwin Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 664, 667 (1965), enforced in part sub noin.,
Local 57, Garment Workers v. NLRB, 2 LAE. REL. REP. (64 L.R.R.M.) 2159 (D.C.
Cir. Jan. 11, 1967). In Garwin just such an approach was taken in the context of
a typical run-away shop situation. The Board provided for a one-year contract bar
for any collective bargaining agreement negotiated by the parties if the union was
unable to reestablish its majority at the new location. In the event a majority was
reestablished, the normal contract bar rules applied. This order was drastically
modified on appeal because it "disciplined" the employer at the expense of the employees at the new location. 2 LAB. RM. REP. (64 L.R.R.M.) at 2164-65. It is not
clear what the Board will or should do on remand.
119 See Bok, supra note 59, at 135, where it is suggested that such an employer
would be an unlikely candidate for a union security clause.
120Cf. Garwin Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 664, 667 (1965), enforced in part mb norn.,
Local 57, Garment Workers v. NLRB, 2 LAn. REL. REP. (64 L.RR.M.) 2159 (D.C.
Cir. Jan. 11, 1967). See also NLRB v. Delight Bakery, Inc., 353 F.2d 344, 347
(6th Cir. 1965), where the possibility of conditioning a bargaining order upon a
subsequent election was discussed though an election was not ordered.
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Board's remedies are geared both to the violations committed by the
employer and the relative positions of the parties at the time of
commission. When the Board discovers "technical" or less serious
violations of the Act, the now standard order should effectively return
the parties to the status quo. However, where "serious" violations
have been committed, additional restorative action should be ordered
with the nature of the remedy dependent upon the virulence of the employer's violations, as these reflect the degree of impact on employee
free choice. If the Board finds that the employer is likely to continue
to commit unfair labor practices rather than honor his employees'
choice, and the union can demonstrate that it would have attained a
majority in the prior campaign but for the employer's unfair labor
practices, the Board should issue a bargaining order, after taking the
suggested safeguards to protect the employees' section 7 rights.
THE TEMPORARY INJUNCTION

Section 10(j) 12 was originally opposed by organized labor as a
return to an era when the labor injunction was consistently used to
However, in recent years, this section
thwart union organization."
has been suggested as a weapon to minimize the effects of employer
123
unfair labor practices, especially in the area of pre-election conduct.
Unfortunately, the Board has not made adequate use of this technique
for alleviating the many remedial problems caused by changes in organizational circumstances' 23 If the Board would seek more injunctions,"
121 NLRA § 10(j), added by 61 Stat. 149 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. 160 (j)
(1964), provides:

The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint . . . charging
that any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice,
to petition any district court of the United States . . . for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order. Upon the filing of any such petition the
court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon such person, and thereupon
shall have jurisdiction to grant to the Board such temporary relief . . . as
it deems just and proper.
See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1947).
1 See S. REP. No. 105, PART 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1947) (minority
report) ; see also Note, The Labor Management Relations Act anzd the Revival of the
Labor Injunction, 48 CoLum. L. REv. 759, 762-66 (1948).
=2 But see McCulloch, An Evaluation of the Remedies Available to the NLRB,
15 LAB. LJ. 755, 758 (1964). See generally McCulloch, New Problems in the Administration of the Labor-Management Relations Act: The Taft-Hartley Infunction,
16 Sw. L.J. 82 (1962).
In fiscal year 1965 the Board
12 4 See, e.g., 30 NLRB ANN. REP. 143 (1965).
sought eight injunctions against employers. It obtained three injunctions, one involving
alleged discriminatory discharges and two in cases where the employer refused to
bargain. See also 1965 HEARINGS ON THE NLRA 7; PuclNsxi REPORT 50. But
see 1966 HEARINGS ON THE NLRA 78 (supplemental statement by Representative
Thompson) : "[Ulse of the § 10(j) injunction is expensive and not particularly effective especially in duty to bargain cases."
125 The use of the injunctive remedy is often criticized in the labor area. See
80 (1930): "Whatever the reason,
FRANKFURTER & GREENE, THE LABOR IxuNcro
it is undeniably the fact that the preliminary injunction in the main determines and
terminates the controversy in court. The tentative truth results in making ultimate
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it could minimize the effects of the employer's unfair labor practices
permit election campaigns to proceed without further
and might
126
difficulty.

Section 10(j) relief is particularly appropriate in cases of discriminatory discharge-a favorite employer tactic during an organizational campaign.1 17 Discharge of several key union advocates can
have repercussions far in excess of the harm to the individual employee. Professor Bok pinpoints the problem:
[R]einstatement with compensation long after the fact may
be far less satisfactory to the employee than continuous employment. But even greater injury may be suffered by the
union and the remaining employees. It is quite clear that
the union's prospects in an election depend to a large extent
on establishing an effective . . . [organization] within the
28

plant.1

When these dangers to employee choice are pitted against the employer's right to "hire and fire" and the relatively small inconvenience
to the employer of awaiting a Board determination of the filed unfair
labor practice charge, it is obvious that the possibility of injury to the
employees' rights far outweighs any court incursion into traditional
employer prerogatives. 2 9
Professor Bok observes that section 10(j) proceedings cannot
be used in all cases involving discriminatory discharges or other
"serious" violations without imposing formidable burdens on the
courts.3 0 This remedy should, however, be available where the emtruth irrelevant." See Note, Temporary Injunctive Relief Under Section 10(e) of the
Taft-Hartley Act, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 460 (1963). Thus often the "temporary relief"
afforded denies the union practical access to the Labor Board, especially in § 10(l)
cases. This is less the case when the employer is enjoined under § 10(j) since, for
example, the employer may eventually discharge an employee if the Board later
determines that he had cause. His discomfiture is merely temporary. He may be
forced to reinstate the employee until the Board has an opportunity to hear the complaint. For cited examples of Board use of § 10(j), see id. at 465 n.22.
126 Since the injunction is a relatively speedy technique (four to six weeks),
see Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under
the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REv. 38, 129 (1964), the employees
will still be in the midst of the organizational campaign and should better respond
to injunctive relief. But see Pollitt, NLRB Re-Run Elections: A Study, 41 N.C.L.
Ray. 209, 211 (1963), suggesting that in the context of the re-run, if the waiting
period prescribed by the Board is too short, the employer is likely to win in the
overwhelming amount of cases.
127 See PucINsKIc REPORT 51.
18 Bok, supra note 120, at 130.
129 Since the union is almost always the charging party, it would undergo no hardship if required to post bond for the employer's protection (as compensation for depriving him of the right to fire, if the unfair labor practice charge is later litigated and the
employer is found guiltless). In cases where an individual petitions the Board this
bond requirement could be omitted. This would serve a deterrent function against
the filing of marginal claims by a union for tactical purposes. But cf. McLeod v.
General Elec. Co., 366 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1966).
130 Bok, mipra note 120, at 131-32.
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ployer is committing "serious" violations in a concerted effort to
avoid a union victory.'81 The required magnitude of the violations
which necessitate relief should be similar to those considered sufficient
for the issuance of a modified bargaining order."
Where the Board
has reasonable cause to believe the employer is engaged in such a
campaign, it should not hesitate to seek injunctive relief. 33 The
Board is not ceding any of its statutory authority to decide unfair
labor practices to the courts, but is merely using the injunctive power
of the courts to preserve the status quo and minimize the damage that
such an employer campaign is likely to have on employee choice. 134
If the injunction is obtained within a relatively short period, the
union should be able to regenerate organizational activity. This is
especially true where any discharged workers are ordered reinstated
pending final determination of the charges by the Board.'35 When
discharged workers are returned to the job, this demonstration that
the law can work rapidly to protect employee organizational rights
should encourage those employees disposed to engage in future organizational activity, erasing some of the effects of the employer's unfair
labor practices.
13 Potter v. United Foods, Inc., 2 LAB. REx. RE,. (58 L.R.R.M.)

2469 (S.D.

Tex. Jan. 16, 1965); Davis v. Ferrantello, 2 LAB. Ram. REP. (56 L.R.R.M.) 2316
(N.D. Tex. April 14, 1964); Brooks v. Holland Die Casting & Plating Co., Case
No. 4718, W.D. Mich., April 30, 1964, cited and summarized in 29 NLRB ANN. REP.
134 (1964); Boire v. Tiffany Tile Corp., 47 CCH Lab. Cas. 1118,235 (M.D. Fla.
1963). But cf. Getreu v. Gas Appliance Supply Corp., C.A. No. 5291, S.D. Ohio,
April 5, 1963, cited and summarized in 28 NLRB ANN. RUT. 145 (1963) ; Johnson
v. Wellington Mfg. Div., 2 LAB. REL. RE'. (49 L.R.R.M.) 2536 (W.D.S.C. Dec. 30,
1961). When deciding a § 10(j) case, courts should keep in mind that they are merely
asked to preserve issues for later determination by the Board. See United States v.
Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 191 (1939):
[C]ourt and agency are not to be regarded as wholly independent and unrelated instrumentalities of justice, each acting in the performance of its
prescribed statutory duty without regard to the appropriate function of the
other in securing the plainly indicated objects of the statute.
132 See notes 101-13 supra and accompanying text.
13 McLeod v. General Electric Co., 257 F. Supp. 690, 702 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd
on other gronds, 366 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1966), vacated as moot, 385 U.S. 533 (1967) ;
Fusco v. Kaase Baking Co., 205 F. Supp. 465, 476 (N.D. Ohio 1962). The suggested
policy allows the Board, subject to the Court's finding that the Board has "reasonable
cause," to keep control of a function which Congress delegated specifically to it, i.e.,
interpreting the basic labor policies as outlined in the act. Contra, Johnston v. J. P.
Stevens & Co., 234 F. Supp. 244, 249 (E.D.N.C. 1964), aft'd, 341 F.2d 891 (4th
Cir. 1965).
384 See McCulloch, New Problems in the Administration of the Labor-Management Relations Act: The Taft-Hartley Injunction, 16 Sw. L.J. 82, 99 (1962). See also
Comment, 45 TEXAs L. REv. 358, 359, 363 (1967), which endorses the position taken
by the Second Circuit in McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 366 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1966)
(a § 10(j) injunction may issue only to preserve the status quo or prevent irreparable
harm). The author suggests the creation of some concrete standards for the issuance
of the injunction.
1'5Butt see Getreu v. Gas Appliance Supply Corp., C.A. No. 5291, S.D. Ohio
April 5, 1963, cited and summarized in 28 NLRB ANN. REP. 145 (1963); Johnson
v. Wellington Mfg. Div., 2 LAB. REL.. RFt. (49 L.R.R.M.) 2536 (W.D.S.C. Dec. 30,
1961). The courts in both cited cases enjoined employer unfair labor practices, but
refused to reinstate the discharged employees, apparently believing that if the Board
found violations of § 8(a) (3), later reinstatement with back pay would be sufficient
remedy.

1967]

EMPLOYER PRE-ELECTION COERCION

1135

CONCLUSION

The remedial tools at the disposal of the Board, if used in an
imaginative way, are quite adequate to cure any employer violation
aimed at the organizational potential of his employees. The remedies
discussed here are only part of the total Board arsensalY
Although
the Board has recently shown some interest in the organizational implications of employer misconduct, further action is necessary if
affected employees are to exercise fully their statutory rights.
136For an extensive listing of additional Board remedies, see FoRKoscH, LABOR
LAw

§§517-27 (2d ed. 1965).

